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Abstract
This Note examines the countervailing duty law and how it was applied in Railcars. Part I
discusses the MTA’s decision to award the subway car contract to Bombardier, Inc., a Canadian
corporation. The countervailing duty proceeding and other legal actions initiated in response to
the allegedly subsidized contract are also described. Part II provides a general background on the
Act. Part III explains the procedure for conducting a countervailing duty proceeding under the
Act. After each step in a countervailing duty proceeding is outlined, its application in Railcars is
discussed. Finally, Part IV analyzes how the Act was misapplied in Railcars.
RAIL CARS FROM CANADA:
A MISAPPLICATION OF THE
COUNTERVAILING DUTY LAW
INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Tariff Act of 19301 (Act) requires that coun-
tervailing duties2 be imposed on merchandise imported into the
United States when a foreign subsidy3 is provided and an
1. The countervailing duty provisions of Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 are codified
at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-1671f (1982) [hereinafter cited as the Act]. For related statutory
provisions, see also, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1516a, 1675, 1677, 2413-2416, 2501-2582 (1982). For
general background on the Act, see 1 P. FELLER, U.S. CUSTOMS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
GUIDE § 17.06 (1979); 2 R. STURM, CUSTOMS LAWS AND ADMINISTRATION § 58 (1983).
2. The term "countervailing duty" was not defined in the Act, but has been defined in
the international agreement on which the Act was based: "The term 'countervailing duty'
shall be understood to mean a special duty levied for the purpose of off-setting any bounty or
subsidy bestowed directly or indirectly upon the manufacture, production or export of any
merchandise, as provided for in Article VI:3 of the General Agreement." Agreement on
Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI, XXIII of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, done Apr. 12, 1979, art. I n.4, 31 U.S.T. 513, T.I.A.S. No. 9619, 18
I.L.M. 579, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as the GATT Agreement]. See also WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 520 (1976).
Webster's defines a countervailing duty as:
[A] duty or surtax imposed on imports to offset an excise or inland revenue tax put
upon articles of the same class manufactured at home; a duty imposed to offset the
advantage to foreign producers derived from a subsidy that their government offers
for the production or export of the article taxed.
Id.
3. "Subsidy" is defined at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1982) as follows:
The term "subsidy" has the same meaning as the term "bounty or grant" as that
term is used in section 1303 of this title, and includes but is not limited to, the
following:
(A) Any export subsidy described in Annex A to the [GATT] Agreement (relat-
ing to illustrative list of export subsidies).
(B) The following domestic subsidies, if provided or required by government
action to a specific enterprise or industry, or group of enterprises or indus-
tries, whether publicly or privately owned, and whether paid or bestowed
directly or indirectly on the manufacture, production, or export of any
class or kind of merchandise:
(i) The provision of capital, loans, or loan guarantees on terms inconsistent
with commercial considerations.
(ii) The provision of goods or services at preferential rates.
(iii) The grant of funds or forgiveness of debt to cover operating losses
sustained by a specific industry.
(iv) The assumption of any costs or expenses of manufacture, production,
or distribution.
Id.; see infra notes 123-44 and accompanying text.
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industry4 in the United States is materially injured 5 by reason
thereof." The duty is equal to the amount of the net subsidy. 7 The
purpose of the countervailing duty is "to offset the unfair competi-
tive advantage that foreign producers would otherwise enjoy from
export subsidies paid by their governments." 8 While the Act pro-
tects the profits of United States industries and the jobs of United
States workers against unfair foreign subsidies, the imposition of a
countervailing duty often results in increased prices for consumers
of subsidized imported goods.
4. "Industry" is defined as: "[T]he domestic producers as a whole of a like product, or
those producers whose collective output of the like product constitutes a major proportion of
the total domestic production of that product." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4) (1982). See infra notes
78-98 and accompanying text.
5. "Material injury" is defined as: "[H]arm which is not inconsequential, immaterial, or
unimportant." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(A) (1982). See infra notes 99-112 and accompanying text.
6. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1982). The Act provides, in part:
(a) General rule-
If
(1) The administering authority determines that-
(A) A country under the Agreement, or
(B) a person who is a citizen or national of such a country, or a corpora-
tion, association, or other organization organized in such a country, is
providing, directly or indirectly, a subsidy with respect to the manu-
facture, production, or exportation of a class or kind of merchandise
imported into the United States, and
(2) The Commission determines that-
(A) an industry in the United States-
(i) is materially injured, or
(ii) is threatened with material injury, or
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially
retarded,
by reason of imports of that merchandise, then there shall be imposed upon such
merchandise a countervailing duty, in addition to any other duty imposed, equal to
the amount of the net subsidy.
Id. The "administering authority" is the United States Department of Commerce (Com-
merce). See injra note 54. The "Commission" is the United States International Trade
Commission. See infra note 53.
The Act applies to merchandise produced in countries that are signatories to the GATT
Agreement, supra note 2, and countries that have assumed equivalent obligations. 19 U.S.C.
§ 1671(a), (b) (1982). The countervailing duty provisions which apply to imports from all
other countries are codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982).
7. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1982). For information on calculation of the net subsidy, see
STATEMENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION (1979), reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. pt. II, at 433; 1979 U.S. CODE CONe. & AD. NEWS 665, 698-99 [hereinafter cited as
STATEMENTS]. See also Michelin Tire Corp. v. United States, 2 Ct. Int'l Trade 143 (1981)
(calculation of subsidy in the form of a low interest rate loan); see infra notes 145-59 and
accompanying text (calculation of the subsidy).
8. Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 455-56 (1978) (citing 30 CONG.
REC. 1674, 2205, 2225 (1897)).
1984] COUNTER VAILING DUTIES
In Railcars From Canada,9 a highly controversial countervail-
ing duty determination, the issue was whether to impose a counter-
vailing duty on the allegedly subsidized import of components for
825 subway cars which the Metropolitan Transportation Authority
of New York 10 (MTA) had ordered from a Canadian corporation."
A countervailing duty of over U.S.$91 million would have been
imposed 2 if the proceeding had not been terminated. 13 The subway
riders and taxpayers of New York would have paid this duty.
Railcars appears to have misapplied the Act by imposing a
countervailing duty even though no United States industries or
workers were materially injured by the alleged subsidy.14 Further-
more, the rulings raise doubts about whether the net subsidy in the
form of export credit financing was properly calculated. 15 The case
was never appealed to the United States Court of International
Trade.'" Railcars may thus have established a precedent which will
discourage other governmental units in the United States from
seeking foreign governmental financing at preferential rates.' 7
9. 48 Fed. Reg. 6569 (Dep't of Com., Int'l Trade Admin. 1983) (final determination
finding subsidies had been provided for imported merchandise); Rail Passenger Cars From
Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. 36,042 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n 1982) (preliminary determination
finding domestic industry had been materially injured by reason of allegedly subsidized
imports).
10. The Metropolitan Transportation Authority of New York (MTA) is a public benefit
corporation created by the New York State Legislature. N.Y. Pun. AUTH. LAW § 1263
(McKinney 1982). Its purpose is to develop and improve commuter transportation and other
services and to implement a unified mass transportation policy for the 12-county metropoli-
tan commuter transportation district which includes New York City. Id. §§ 1262, 1264.
11. Railcars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. 31,415 (U.S. Dep't of Com., Int'l Trade
Admin. 1982) (initiation of countervailing duty investigation).
12. Railcars From Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 6569, 6570 (U.S. Dep't of Com., Int'l Trade
Admin. 1983). Commerce determined the net subsidy to be U.S.$110,565 per subway car. Id.
The total duty was calculated as follows: U.S.$110,565 (net subsidy per subway car) multi-
plied by 825 (number of cars purchased) equals U.S.$91,216,125. See infra notes 146-59 and
accompanying text (calculation of the subsidy).
13. On February 9, 1983, the ITC terminated its countervailing duty investigation
before reaching a final determination. See Rail Passenger Cars and Parts Thereof From
Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 6793, 6794 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n 1983).
14. See infra notes 160-217 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 145-55 and accompanying text.
16. An "interested party" in a countervailing duty proceeding may obtain judicial
review of countervailing duty determinations pursuant to 19 U.S.C. §§ 1516-1516a (1982).
Because Railcars was terminated, no appeal was filed.
17. See [Jan.-Mar.] U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 18, at 600 (Feb. 9, 1983). In
announcing Commerce's final determination in Railcars, Commerce Secretary Malcolm
Baldrige asserted that the affirmative determination "should be a warning to other potential
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This Note examines the countervailing duty law and how it
was applied in Railcars. Part I discusses the MTA's decision to
award the subway car contract to Bombardier, Inc., a Canadian
corporation. The countervailing duty proceeding and other legal
actions initiated in response to the allegedly subsidized contract are
also described. Part II provides a general background on the Act.
Part III explains the procedure for conducting a countervailing
duty proceeding under the Act. After each step in a countervailing
duty proceeding is outlined, its application in Railcars is discussed.
Finally, Part IV analyzes how the Act was misapplied in Railcars.
I. BACKGROUND: RAILCARS FROM CANADA
A. Award of the Contract
In 1981, the MTA solicited bids for the production of 1150
subway cars for New York City's deteriorating public transporta-
tion system.' 8 In March 1982, the MTA awarded a contract for the
initial 325 cars to the Nissho-Iwai American Corporation, repre-
foreign suppliers, especially of large capital equipment projects, who think that government
subsidized financing is the way to get a competitive advantage." Id. See also Note, Export
Subsidies: Predatory Financing and the MTA-Bonbardier Contract, 9 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
385, 408 (1983).
18. See U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Report to the Commission on Investigation No. 701-
TA-182 (Final) Rail Passenger Cars and Parts Thereof From Canada, at A-18 to A-19 (Jan.
31, 1983) (available from the U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Wash., D.C.) [hereinafter cited as
ITC Final Rep.]. In April 1981, the MTA solicited bids to purchase 325 subway cars with
options to purchase up to a total of 1150. See id. at A-18. At that time, the MTA planned to
finance the subway cars with funds from the Urban Mass Transportation Authority of the
United States Department of Transportation. See id. The MTA later considered a combina-
tion of safe-harbor leasing and its own bond issue to finance the subway cars. Id. at A-19.
However, the MTA questioned whether it could market over U.S.$1 billion of bonds in the
time frame required to fund the purchase of the planned order of 1150 cars. See MTA
Memorandum Regarding MTA-Bombardier Subway Car Contract Award 1 (1982), re-
printed in ITC Final Rep., supra, at A-54 [hereinafter cited as MTA Memorandum]. In the
summer of 1981, the MTA received competitive bids for 325 subway cars. The MTA believed
that the low bid of U.S.$895,000 per car was excessive. See id. The MTA realized that it
could achieve substantial savings by negotiating the purchase of the cars instead of using the
competitive bidding process required by state law. See id. In order to reduce the cost of the
cars and to attract sufficient vendor-related financing, the New York Legislature enacted
legislation to authorize the negotiated purchase of subway cars. N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAW §
1209(2), (3) (McKinney 1982). On November 15, 1981, the MTA resolicited bids, offering a
contract for all 1150 cars. See ITC Final Rep., supra, at A-19.
The order for 1150 subway cars was part of a U.S.$7.9 billion program by the MTA to
rebuild the New York City public transportation system over five years. See MTA Memoran-
dum, supra, at 1. See also N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAW § 1269-b(1) (McKinney 1982) (requiring the
MTA to develop a five-year capital program for New York City's mass transit facilities).
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senting Kawasaki Heavy Industries of Japan.' 9 For the remaining
825 cars, the MTA negotiated with three other subway car-
builders: 20 Bombardier, Inc. (Bombardier), a Canadian railcar
manufacturer; 21 Budd Company (Budd), a United States producer
of railcars; 22 and Francorail, a consortium of French industrial
companies.
23
19. ITC Final Rep., supra note 18, at A-21. Nissho-Iwai offered financing through the
Export-Import Bank of Japan on 46% of the contract price for 325 cars at an effective interest
rate of 12.25%. Id. at A-20. The Japanese government loan was not challenged as a subsidy
because it was above the Japanese commercial interest rates and within the parameter set for
Japan under the Org. for Economic Cooperation and Dev. Trade Directorate, Arrangement
on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits, OECD Doe. TD/Consensus/78.4 (1st
Rev.) (Feb. 22, 1978) [hereinafter cited as OECD Arrangement]. Id. See [Apr.-Sept.] U.S.
EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 410, at 309 (June 1, 1982). In October 1982, the MTA announced
that because of a favorable response to its issuance of bonds at an average rate of 9.7%, it had
decided to cancel its loan from the Export-Import Bank of Japan. See ITC Final Rep., supra
note 18, at A-21 n.1.
Budd had submitted a competing bid for this contract. See ITC Final Rep., supra note
18, at A-20. Budd had obtained offers of financing from the Brazilian and Portugese govern-
ments by agreeing to produce certain components in those countries. The foreign financing
enabled Budd to offer the MTA financing for about 17% of the value of the contract. Id.
20. See ITC Final Rep., supra note 18, at A-22.
In addition to the three bidders with whom the MTA negotiated, Pullman-Standard Co.
of Chicago, a prime contractor of rail passenger cars, had begun preparations to submit a bid
for the contract. Pullman decided not to submit a bid because of its inability to compete with
the reported availability of foreign government financing at 9.5 %, the onerous nature of the
design specifications, and its unwillingness to assume certain liability risks. See id. at A-20.
Nissho-Iwai, which had won the earlier MTA contract for 325 subway cars, did not bid
because it did not have the production capacity to fill this order. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n,
U.S.I.T.C. Pub. No. 1277, Certain Rail Passenger Cars and Parts Thereof From Canada, at
A-44. (Aug. 1982) (available from the U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Wash., D.C.) [hereinafter
cited as ITC Prelim. Rep.].
21. ITC Final Rep., supra note 18, at A-22. Bombardier, Inc. (Bombardier) assembles
rail passenger cars in the United States and Canada. The subway car shell is the only major
component it produces. Bombardier has rail passenger plants in Quebec, Canada and Barre,
Vermont. It subcontracts for railcar components and subassemblies from numerous suppliers
in the United States and elsewhere. ITC Prelim. Rep., supra note 20, at A-7.
22. ITC Final Rep., supra note 18, at A-22. Budd, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the
West German firm Thyssen AG, is the only United States firm to have independently bid as a
prime contractor for rail passenger car contracts since 1979. Id. at A-11. Budd is a large,
diversified, multinational manufacturing corporation with plants in several United States
and foreign locations. Id. In addition to offering services as a prime contractor for rail
passenger cars, Budd assembles rail passenger cars and manufactures two major rail passen-
ger car components, the shell and the truck. Budd's assembly and shell manufacturing
facilities are at its Red Lion Plant in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Id. at A-12.
In February 1981, the MTA awarded Budd a contract for the production and delivery of
130 commuter railcars with an option to purchase an additional 208 cars. Id. at A-18. In
April 1982, the MTA exercised its option for the additional 208 cars. However, production of
some of the additional cars was contingent upon the availability of safe-harbor leasing, Id.
23. ITC Final Rep., supra note 18, at A-22. Francorail is a prime contractor of rail
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Section 1209(3) of the New York State Public Authorities Law
authorized the MTA to award the subway car contracts by negotia-
tion, instead of on the basis of sealed bids, provided that certain
specified factors were considered in the negotiations.2 4 The MTA,
therefore, based its decision to award the contract on the following
statutory and other criteria: 25 availability and cost of financing,
price of the subway cars,26 delivery schedules, 27 quality of design,
engineering, and performance,"' possible overdependence on one
passenger cars. During the period 1977 to 1982, it bid on two United States rail passenger car
contracts, but won neither. Id. at A-i1.
24. N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAW § 1209(3) (McKinney 1982). "The factors subject to negotia-
tion shall include, but need not be limited to, financing, cost, delivery schedules, and
performance of all or a portion of the contract at sites within the state of New York or using
goods produced and services provided within the state of New York." Id. § 1209(3)(a).
Section 1209(3) authorized the MTA to award a contract by negotiation without competitive
bidding provided certain standards and procedures were followed. Id. § 1209(3). Section
1209(2) authorized the MTA to declare that competitive bidding is inappropriate in certain
circumstances. Id. § 1209(2). The MTA had sought this legislation because it believed that by
negotiating the contracts it could reduce the price of the cars and attract vendor related
financing on favorable terms. MTA Memorandum, supra note 18, at 1.
25. ITC Final Rep., supra note 18, at A-22. See also MTA Memorandum, supra note
18, at 1-2.
26. Bombardier's final price per car was U.S.$798,770 for a total contract price of
U.S.$658,985,250. See Summary of Negotiations and Proposed Agreement Between the MTA
and Bombardier Inc., 825 IRT Subway Cars 1 (June 8, 1982) (available at the office of the
MTA, New York) [hereinafter cited as Summary of Negotiations]. Budd's final price per car
was U.S.$770,768. The MTA, however, believed that certain contractual provisions for final
payment and the requirement to use certain New York State components would raise Budd's
price to U.S.$799,885. See ITC Final Rep., supra note 18, at A-23 to A-24. Francorail's final
price per car was U.S.$814,000. See Summary of Negotiations, supra, at 3.
27. Bombardier planned to deliver a ten car test train in July 1984 and all cars by May
1987. See Summary of Negotiations, supra note 26, at 1. The MTA found that Bombardier's
recent delivery record had been impressive. See ITC Prelim. Rep., supra note 20, at A-38. See
also Rail Passenger Cars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. 36,042, 36,048 (U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n 1982) (preliminary determination) (Stern, Comm'r, dissenting). Budd promised to
deliver all cars by October 1986. See Summary of Negotiations, supra note 26, at 3. Budd was
behind in current orders with a backlog of more than 1000 cars. See ITC Prelim. Rep., supra
note 20, at A-38. Budd proposed to assemble the MTA cars at a new facility in Hornell, New
York. The MTA was concerned that the facility would require substantial capital investment
and the hiring and training of a new work force. See id. Furthermore, Budd insisted that
liquidated damages be waived for the first two months of delay in the event the New York
assembly facility was used. See Summary of Negotiations, supra note 26, at 3.
28. Bombardier had entered into a licensing agreement with Kawasaki Heavy Indus-
tries, so that the Bombardier cars had the advantage of being compatible with the 325 cars
the MTA had already ordered from Nissho-Iwai. ITC Final Rep., supra note 18, at A-30. See
also Rail Passenger Cars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. 36,042, 36,048 (U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n 1982) (preliminary determination) (Stern, Comm'r, dissenting). The MTA expected
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supplier, 9 and New York State content. 30 The availability of fi-
nancing was an important factor in the MTA's decision,'3 1 but not
necessarily the determinative one.32 To support Bombardier's final
bid, the Export Development Corporation of Canada 33 (EDC) of-
fered financing at an interest rate of 9.7 % per annum to cover 85 %
of the contract price. 34 Bombardier's financing was equivalent to
that this similarity of design would substantially reduce maintenance costs. ITC Final Rep.,
supra note 18, at A-30. In general, the MTA decided that Bombardier had made the best
offer with respect to car quality and overall confidence in carbuilder engineering. MTA
Memorandum, supra note 18, at 1.
29. The MTA wanted to increase the number of sources for its equipment. ITC Final
Rep., supra note 18, at A-30. By ordering from Bombardier, the MTA increased its number
of suppliers for equipment in general and for cars following the Nissho-lwai design in
particular. Id.
30. Bombardier offered a minimum New York State content of U.S.$125,000 per car
(16% of car price) excluding transportation and on-site staffing, with a promise to try to
increase the New York content to U.S.$160,000 per car (20% of car price). See Summary of
Negotiations, supra note 26, at 2. Budd offered a New York State content of 12% of the car
cost. Id. at 3. However, Budd contended that if it used New York Air Brake Co. components,
its New York State content would have been approximately 19%. See ITC Final Rep., supra
note 18, at A-29. Francorail offered a New York State content of 8% of the car cost. See
Summary of Negotiations, supra note 26, at 3.
It was estimated that the Bombardier contract would generate 2384 years of employ-
ment in New York State; the Budd contract would generate 2340 years of employment. See
ITC Final Rep., supra note 18, at A-29.
31. Rail Passenger Cars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. at 36,043; ITC Final Rep., supra
note 18, at A-24; ITC Prelim. Rep., supra note 20, at A-9, A-50.
32. "The MTA, in its contract with Bombardier, has agreed that if a countervailing
duty order should be issued the financing agreement with [the] Canadian Government will
be modified in such a way as to offset or eliminate any net subsidy which is found to exist.
According to the MTA, it is willing to take such steps to offset a subsidy because it believes
Bombardier's proposal is worth accepting even at a higher cost." ITC Final Rep., supra note
18, at A-30 (footnotes omitted). "[B]ased upon the Treasury Department's inquiry into this
matter, I have concluded that Bombardier would be awarded the contract even if Budd were
able to offer matching financing." ITC Prelim. Rep., supra note 20, at A-43. "[T]he record
indicates that even if Budd had obtained equivalent financing, it would not have been
awarded the contract." Rail Passenger Cars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. at 36,048 (Stern,
Comm'r, dissenting) (footnote omitted).
33. The Export Development Corporation of Canada (EDC) is a Canadian Crown
Corporation wholly owned by the government of Canada. Canadian Export Development
Act, CAN. REv. STAT. ch. E-18 (1970) (amended 1981). The EDC was formed to facilitate
and develop Canada's export trade within the framework of the Canadian Export Develop-
ment Act by providing insurance, guarantees, loans, and other financial facilities. Id.
34. Railcars from Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 6569, 6571 (U.S. Dep't of Com., Int'l Trade
Admin. 1983) (final determination). On May 11, 1982, shortly before the MTA announced its
decision to award the contract to Bombardier, EDC issued a "Management Letter" to the
MTA indicating its willingness to consider providing export credit financing to the MTA of up
to 85% of United States costs incurred by Bombardier, subject to satisfaction of EDC's
Canadian content criteria, final approval of EDC's Board of Directors and the government of
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that offered by Francorail and significantly more favorable than
that offered by Budd. 35 The MTA estimated that it would save
U.S.$36 million in net present value and U.S.$241 million in future
payments by choosing Bombardier's bid instead of Budd's. 3 The
MTA concluded that Bombardier's final offer was superior to the
other bids based on all the criteria considered, with the possible
exception of subway car price. 37 Consequently, the MTA awarded
Bombardier a U.S.$660 million contract to produce 825 subway
cars. 3
8
B. Legal Actions Pursued by Budd
Budd strongly opposed the award of the contract to Bombar-
dier, contending that the award was illegal and would cause harm
to a United States industry. 3 Even before the contract was signed,
Budd initiated legal actions in an effort to wrest the contract away
from Bombardier.
Canada, and receipt of satisfactory evidence that Francorail was supported by equivalent
financing. The terms were as follows: financing up to 85% of the sale price of Canadian
equipment and services tip to U.S.$646 million, at an interest rate of 9.7%, repayable in 17
equal consecutive semi-annual installments commencing on the earlier of six months follow-
ing final delivery of the cars or an outside date to be determined by the EDC. The May 11
letter also contained provisions for fees and expenses to be borne by the MTA and several
conditions. Id.
35. Summary of Negotiations, supra note 26, at 1-3. Budd offered financing for 17% of
the contract price. This represented a portion of the value of trucks and propulsion equip-
ment manufactured in Brazil and car shells manufactured in Portugal. See id. at 2. The
interest rate for the Brazil financing was 8.5 % with repayment over nine years. The interest
rate for the Portugal financing was 10.25% with repayment over five and one-half years. See
id. at 2. Francorail offered financing for 85% of the contract price at a rate and repayment
terms comparable to the Bombardier proposal. See id. at 3. See also, ITC Final Rep., supra
note 18, at A-21.
36. ITC Prelim. Rep., supra note 20, at A-9 to A-10.
37. See id. at A-22.
38. Railcars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. 31,415, 31,415 (U.S. Dep't of Com., Int'l
Trade Admin. 1982) (initiation of investigation). The MTA and Bombardier executed a
binding agreement for 825 passenger railcars on June 10, 1982. Id. The effective date of the
actual "award" of the contract was contingent upon Bombardier's entry into a specified
financing agreement with the MTA, ratification of the contract by the MTA's Board of
Directors, and approval of the contract by the New York State Public Authorities Control
Board. Commerce concluded that each of these conditions was ministerial in nature and that
the contract became effective within seven days after the conditions were satisfied (if satisfac-
tion occurred on or before July 23, 1982). Id. This was the largest single order for railcars in
United States history. Rail Passenger Cars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. 36,042, 36,048 (U.S.
Int'l Trade Comm'n 1982) (preliminary determination) (Stern, Comm'r, dissenting).
39. See [Apr.-Sept.] U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 129, at 221-22 (May 26, 1982).
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On May 18, 1982, the same day the MTA announced its
decision to award the contract to Bombardier, Budd requested
financing pursuant to section 1912 of the Export-Import Bank Act
Amendments of 197840 to match the financing offered by the EDC
for Bombardier's bid. 4' The Secretary of the Treasury may autho-
rize such financing if the availability of foreign "noncompetitive"
financing 2 is "likely to be a determining factor" in a sale. 43 On June
8, 1982, Budd filed a complaint in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York to enjoin final approval of
the MTA-Bombardier contract until the Secretary of the Treasury
could decide whether to authorize matching financing for Budd
from the Export-Import Bank of the United States (Eximbank) .44
Budd, Bombardier, and the MTA, the principal parties to the
action, stipulated that the MTA could cancel its agreement with
Bombardier and resume negotiations with Budd if the Eximbank
offered financing that matched EDC's terms. 45 In return, Budd
agreed to withdraw its complaint after the Treasury Department
ruled on Budd's application for financing. 4 The Secretary of the
Treasury concluded that the EDC financing was "noncompetitive"
but that it was not "likely to be a determining factor" in the MTA's
40. See ITC Prelim. Rep., supra note 20, at A-43 to A-44. Export-Import Bank Act
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, tit. XIX, § 1912, 92 Stat. 3724, 3726 (codified at
12 U.S.C. § 635a-3 (1982)). The act provides in part:
The Secretary of the Treasury shall only issue such authorization to the Bank to
provide guarantees, insurance and credits to competing United States sellers, if he
determines that: (1) the availability of foreign official noncompetitive financing is
likely to be a determining factor in the sale, and (2) the foreign noncompetitive
financing has not been withdrawn on the date the Bank is authorized to provide
competitive financing.
12 U.S.C. § 635a-3(b) (1982).
41. ITC Prelim. Rep., supra note 20, at A-55.
42. Financing is "noncompetitive" if it exceeds "limits under existing standards, min-
utes, or practices to which the United States and other major exporting countries have
agreed." 12 U.S.C. § 635a-3 (1982).
43. Id.
44. Budd Co. v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., No. 82 Civ. 3744 (S.D.N.Y. July 16,
1982) (order of dismissal). Budd filed the complaint on June 8, 1982. Id. Budd sought to
enjoin the MTA's submission of the contract to the New York State Public Authorities Control
Board, the final step needed for approval.
45. Id. See ITC Prelim. Rep., supra note 20, at A-45. The MTA must exercise the option
to cancel within seven days of the MTA's receipt of a copy of the commitment. Id.
46. Budd. Co. v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., No. 82 Civ. 3744 (S.D.N.Y. July 16,
1982) (order of dismissal).
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decision. 47 The Secretary, therefore, refused to authorize Eximbank
financing for Budd. 48 Thereupon, Budd's suit was dismissed. 49
While the lawsuit and its request for Eximbank financing were
pending, Budd filed a countervailing duty petition 50 which several
labor unions joined as "interested parties."' 5' The petition alleged
47. See ITC Prelim. Rep., supra note 20, at A-43. The Secretary of the Treasury
determined as follows:
I have determined that the EDC financing offered in support of Bombardier's
proposal exceeds allowable international limits on export credits, and that the EDC
has refused to withdraw its noncompetitive financing despite repeated requests by
officials of the Treasury Department. However, based upon the Treasury Depart-
ment's inquiry into this matter, I have concluded that Bombardier would be
awarded the contract even if Budd were able to offer matching financing. Thus, I
am compelled to conclude that the noncompetitive financing offered by EDC is not
likely to be "a determining factor" in MTA's decision.
Id. (footnote omitted).
48. Id. at A-44. The Secretary of the Treasury determined as follows: "Under these
circumstances, section 1912 does not permit me to authorize Eximbank financing for Budd."
Id.
49. Budd Co. v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., No. 82 Civ. 3744 (S.D.N.Y. July 16,
1982) (order of dismissal).
50. Railcars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. 31,415 (U.S. Dep't of Com., Int'l Trade
Admin. 1982) (initiation of investigation). Budd filed the petition with Commerce and the
ITC on June 3, 1982. ITC Final Rep., supra note 18, at A-1. On June 10, 1982, Budd advised
Commerce and the ITC that it intended to supplement its petition, and requested that
Commerce not consider the petition completely filed until that time. Id. Budd filed its
supplement on June 24, 1982, which instituted a preliminary countervailing duty investiga-
tion. Id. 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(b)(1) (1982) authorizes amendments to a countervailing duty
petition "at such time, and upon such conditions, as the administering authority and the
Commission may permit." Id. Budd did not file for any other form of import relief in
connection with the MTA contract. ITC Final Rep., supra note 18, at A-4.
51. "Interested party" is defined at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9) (1982). On July 14, 1982, the
Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO, the United Automobile and Aerospace Workers,
and the United Steel Workers of America requested status as co-petitioners in the proceeding.
Railcars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. 53,760, 53,761 (U.S. Dep't of Com., Int'l Trade
Admin. 1982) (preliminary determination). These labor organizations claimed to represent
workers in the United States subway car manufacturing industry and supplying industries.
See id. Commerce determined that Budd and the labor organizations were "interested
parties" within the meaning of 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9) (1982). See Railcars From Canada, 47
Fed. Reg. at 53,761.
On June 3, 1982, several unions filed a petition with the United States Trade Represent-
ative pursuant to section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2414 (1982)).
Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO, 47 Fed. Reg. 31,764 (U.S. Trade Rep. 1982) (initiation of
investigation). The following labor organizations filed the petitions: Industrial Union De-
partment, AFL-CIO, United Automobile and Aerospace Workers, International Association
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, and Districts 19 and 31, United Steelworkers of
America. Id. at 31,765. The petition requested "[t]hat the President take steps to restrict the
importation of the Canadian subway cars built with the assistance of the low-cost export
financing." Id. On July 19, 1982, the United States Trade Representative decided to initiate
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that the EDC's export credit financing and federal and provincial
regional grants provided by the Canadian government constituted a
countervailable subsidy under the Act. 2
The United States International Trade Commission 53 (ITC)
and the Department of Commerce54 (Commerce) both ruled in
favor of Budd. 5 The ITC preliminarily determined that a domestic
industry was materially injured or threatened with material injury
by reason of the allegedly subsidized import of subway car compo-
nents.56 Commerce determined that the export credit financing and
federal and provincial regional grants constituted subsidies57 and
an investigation pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 2412(2) (1982). 47 Fed. Reg. at 31,764. On
September 23, 1982, the Office of the United States Trade Representative announced that it
was terminating without prejudice the section 301 investigation after the ITC issued its
affirmative preliminary countervailing duty determination in the same matter. Industrial
Union Dep't, AFL-CIO, 47 Fed. Reg. 42,059 (U.S. Trade Rep. 1982). As a matter of policy,
the United States Trade Representative terminates its investigation when the same matter is
subject to investigation under some other provision of law. Id.
52. Railcars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. at 31,415.
53. The Act places in the United States International Trade Commission (ITC or
Commission) the authority and responsibility to conduct "material injury" investigations in
countervailing duty determinations pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2) (1982). The federal
regulations governing ITC countervailing duty investigations are codified at 19 C.F.R. §§
207.1-46 (1983). The ITC investigates the administration and fiscal and industrial effects of
the customs laws, among other duties. 19 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1982). The statutory provisions
relating to the ITC's powers and structure are codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1330-1332 (1982).
Formerly known as the United States Tariff Commission, the ITC's name was changed in the
Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 171, 88 Stat. 1978, 2009 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §
2231 (1982)).
54. The Act places the authority and responsibility for its administration, other than
injury determinations, upon the "administering authority" which is defined as: "[T]he Secre-
tary of the Treasury, or any other officer of the United States to whom the responsibility for
carrying out the duties of the administering authority under this subtitle are transferred by
law." 19 U.S.C. § 1677(1) (1982). Pursuant to the President's Reorganization Plan No. 3 of
1979, 3 C.F.R. 513-17 (1980), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1170-72 (1982), and Executive
Order No. 12,188, 3 C.F.R. 131-35 (1981), authority to administer the countervailing duty
law was transferred from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Secretary of Commerce
effective January 2, 1980. The exercise of that authority is under the general supervision of
the Under Secretary for International Trade, and the immediate supervision of the Assistant
Secretary for Trade Administration who, through the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Import
Administration, supervises the administering agency, the International Trade Administra-
tion. See Countervailing Duties, [Reference File] U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 40:0102
(1983).
55. Rail Passenger Cars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. 36,042 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n
1982) (preliminary determination); Railcars From Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 6569 (U.S. Dep't of
Com., Int'l Trade Admin. 1982) (final determination).
56. Rail Passenger Cars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. at 36,042.
57. Railcars From Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. at 6570. Commerce determined as follows:
Based upon our investigation, we have determined that certain benefits which
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imposed a countervailing duty of U.S.$91 million. 58 Before the
ITC's final determination, Budd and the unions withdrew their
petition and the ITC terminated the proceeding. 59 As a result, the
MTA was not required to pay any countervailing duties.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE ACT
Since 1897, countervailing duties have been imposed on im-
ported merchandise that benefitted from foreign bounties or
grants. 60 Until 1980, the United States countervailing duty law
constitute subsidies within the meaning of section 701 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as
amended .... are being provided to Bombardier, Inc. (Bombardier), a manufac-
turer and exporter in Canada of railcars ...
The following programs are found to confer subsidies.
" Export credit financing.
" Federal and provincial regional grants.
id.
58. Railcars From Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. at 6570. Commerce determined the net
subsidy to be U.S.$110,565 per railcar produced by Bombardier for use by the MTA. Id. For
calculation of the total subsidy, see supra note 12.
59. Rail Passenger Cars and Parts Thereof From Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 6793, 6793-94
(U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n 1983) (termination of countervailing duty investigation). Termina-
tion of a countervailing duty investigation on withdrawal of a petition is authorized by 19
U.S.C. § 1671c(a) (1982). Budd withdrew its countervailing duty petition because it felt it
had established a precedent that would discourage improperly subsidized financing in the
future. [Jan.-Mar.] U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 19, at 636-37 (Feb. 16, 1983). Budd
maintained that it did not wish to subject New York or the MTA to the risk of countervailing
duties. Id. at 637. Budd's hope that it would receive future contracts from the MTA
significantly influenced its decision to withdraw its petition. Id. at 636-37.
60. For a comprehensive history of the United States countervailing duty law, see
generally, S. METZGE1, LOWERINc NONTARIFF BARRIERs 101-04 (1974); Butler, Countervailing
Duties and Export Subsidization: A Re-emerging Issue in International Trade, 9 VA. J. INT'L
L. 82, 83-86, 96-97 (1968); Feller, Mutiny Against the Bounty: An Examination of Subsidies,
Border Tax Adjustnents, and the Resurgence of the Countervailing Duty Law, I LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 17, 19-26 (1969).
The idea of countervailing duties originated over 100 years before the first United States
countervailing duty law was enacted. In 1776, economist Adam Smith condemned the
artificial stimulation of exports. "The effect of bounties, like that of all the other expedients of
the mercantile system, can only be to force the trade of a country into a channel much less
advantageous than that in which it would naturally run of its own accord." A. SMITH, AN
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 80 (J. Rogers ed. 1869).
In 1791, Alexander Hamilton proposed that a special duty be imposed on certain subsidized
commodity imports and that the resulting revenue be used in turn to fund a subsidy program
for the domestic production of such commodities. A. HAMILTON, Final Version of the Report
on the Subject of Manufactures, 10 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 230, 300 (1966).
Congress enacted the world's first countervailing duty law in 1890 to offset export
bounties on refined sugar. Tariff of 1890, ch. 1244, para. 237, 26 Stat. 567, 584. The Tariff
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generally did not require a finding of injury to United States pro-
ducers before a duty was imposed. 1
The Trade Agreements Act of 197912 added a new countervail-
ing duty provision to the Tariff Act of 1930. This provision applies
only to exports from countries that are signatories to the Agreement
of 1894 extended the countervailing duty provision to cover export bounties on raw as well as
refined sugar. Tariff of 1894, ch. 349, para. 1821/2, 28 Stat. 509, 521.
Section 5 of the Tariff of 1897, ch. 11, § 5, 30 Stat. 151, 205, was the first general
countervailing duty law in the United States and forms the basis of the current law. See
Feller, supra, at 21. It imposed a countervailing duty on all dutiable merchandise for which a
foreign government had paid or bestowed, directly or indirectly, a bounty or grant on
exportation. Tariff of 1897, ch. 11, § 5, 30 Stat. 151, 205. The term "bounty or grant" was
not defined in the statute but has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in
Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443 (1978); Nicholas & Co. v. United States,
249 U.S. 34 (1919); and Downs v. United States, 187 U.S. 496 (1903). The law did riot
require proof of injury to a domestic industry before imposition of a duty. See Feller, supra,
at 21-22. The Tariff of 1909, ch. 6, § 6, 36 Stat. 11, 85, and the Tariff of 1913, ch. 16, §
IV(E), 38 Stat. 114, 193-94, reenacted the 1897 provision without substantial alteration.
In 1922, Congress broadened the scope of the countervailing duty law to cover bounties
or grants bestowed upon the manufacture or production of goods as well as upon their
exportation. Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 303, 42 Stat. 858, 935-36. It was also extended to
cover subsidies granted by private sources. Id.
The Tariff Act of 1930 reenacted the 1922 countervailing duty provision without sub-
stantial change. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, tit. III, § 303, 46 Stat. 590, 687.
The Trade Act of 1974 reenacted the 1930 countervailing duty provision with respect to
dutiable merchandise. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, sec. 331, § 303(a)(1), 88 Stat.
1978, 2049. The Trade Act of 1974 also authorized imposition of countervailing duties on
nondutiable merchandise provided that, if required by the international obligations of the
United States, the United States Tariff Commission first determined that a United States
industry was injured or likely to be injured. Id. § 303(a)(2). The Trade Act of 1974 estab-
lished time limits within which the Treasury Department was required to complete its
determination. Id. § 303(a)(4). The Trade Act of 1974 also authorized the President, subject
to Congressional approval, to negotiate tariff modifications and reductions in nontarriff
barriers, including countervailing duties. Id. § 102. These negotiations became known as the
Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. See infra note 62.
61. S. REP. No, 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 38, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 381, 424 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 249]. Under prior law, duties were imposed
merely upon a finding of the existence of an export subsidy. "'No showing [of injury to a
domestic industry] is required to impose countervailing duties tinder ...[prior] U.S. law,
unless the imported product is otherwise duty-free and international obligations of the United
States require a showing of injury." Id. This injury requirement was added to United States
law by the Trade Act of 1974. See supra note 60.
62. Pub. L. No. 96-39, §§ 701-707, 93 Stat. 144, 150-62 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671-
1671f (1982)).
[The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 was adopted to] make necessary and appropri-
ate changes in United States law to implement the results of the Tokyo Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations [Tokyo Round]. The Tokyo Round was the seventh
round of trade negotiations held under the auspices of the General Agreement on
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on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade6 3 (GATT Agreement)
or have accepted equivalent obligations. 4
The new countervailing duty provision establishes a bifurcated
procedure by which Commerce and the ITC share responsibility for
determining whether to impose a countervailing duty on allegedly
subsidized imported goods.65 In accordance with prior law, Com-
merce determines whether a countervailable subsidy has been pro-
vided by a foreign government.66 As a result of a significant and
controversial change enacted in 1979,67 before a countervailing
Tariffs and Trade [opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter cited as GATT]] since 1948. The first five
rounds [of multilateral trade negotiations] were concerned solely with tariff reduc-
tions. As average tariff rates in industrial countries became progressively lower, the
effects on trade of national laws and policies other than tariffs, "non-tariff barriers"
(NTB's), became more apparent. At the same time, direct and indirect government
intervention in economic matters became more pervasive and, therefore, the num-
ber of NTB's increased
• . . The principle object of the Tokyo Round was the elimination, reduction,
or "harmonization", i.e., uniformity, of certain NTB's ....
S. REP. No. 249, supra note 61, at 1-2. For general background on GATT, see 1 W. SuaREY &
D. WALLACE, JR., A LAwYER's GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL BUSINESs TRANSACTIONS 37-84
(1977). See also GATT Agreements, supra note 2. For background on the Tokyo Round, see
generally NON-TARIFF BARRIERS AFTER THE TOKYO ROUND (J. Quinn & P. Slayton ed. 1982); A.
Wolff, The U.S. Mandate for Trade Negotiations, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 505-64 (1976).
63. GATT Agreement, supra note 2.
64. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(b) (1982).
65. Id. § 1671 (1982).
66. Id. § 1671(a)(1). Before January 2, 1980, the authority and responsibility for subsidy
determinations were vested in the United States Treasury Department. See supra note 54.
67. S. REP. No. 249, supra note 61, at 38. "The most conspicuous change in current law
required by the [GATT Agreement] and adopted by this title is the introduction of a material
injury test before any countervailing duty may be imposed on products of countries which
assume the obligations of the agreement relating to subsidies and countervailing measures."
Id.
"Material injury" has been controversial and unclear since the Tokyo Round, as illus-
trated by the following story told by Richard Rivers, former General Counsel, Office of
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations: During the implementation of the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144, former Secretary of State Cyrus
Vance asked a Department of State staff member, "[W]hat's all this about material injury?"
The staff member replied, "Well, Mr. Secretary, it's like 'consubstantiation' and 'transsub-
stantiation.' You can't really explain it, but people have fought wars over it." Introductory
Remarks by R. Rivers, former General Counsel, Office of Special Representative for Trade
Negotiations, at the Seventh Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals (Apr. 11, 1980), reprinted in 88 F.R.D. 369, 476-77 (1980).
For discussion of the controversy regarding the material injury standard, see Note,
Implementing "Tokyo Round" Commitments: the New Injury Standard in Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Laws, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1980).
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duty can be imposed, the ITC must now determine that an industry
in the United States is materially injured or threatened with mate-
rial injury, or the establishment of an industry in the United States
is materially retarded, by reason of the subsidized imports.6 8 The
"material injury" requirement makes it more difficult for United
States industries and unions to obtain relief under the countervail-
ing duty laws; other provisions of the Act, however, strengthen the
relief available to domestic producers.6 9
III. PROCEDURE INA COUNTERVAILING
DUTY PROCEEDING
A countervailing duty proceeding 70 ordinarily begins when an
"interested party"7' files a satisfactory petition with Commerce and
the ITC on behalf of an "industry. '72 If Commerce finds that the
68. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(2) (1982). The ITC must determine that: "(A) an industry in
the United States-(i) is materially injured, or (ii) is threatened with material injury, or (B)
the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded, by reason of
imports [of merchandise subject to an investigation]." Id.
69. See Note, supra note 67, at 1183-84. For the provisions which strengthen relief
available, see 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671a(c), 1671b(a), 1671b(b), 1671d (shortening time period
within which determinations must be made); 1516, 1516a (providing judicial review) (1982).
70. The procedure for conducting a countervailing duty investigation is governed by 19
U.S.C. §§ 1671-1671f (1982). The statutory provisions roughly follow the chronology of a
countervailing duty investigation. The regulations can be found at 19 C.F.R. §§ 207.1-46,
355.0-44 (1983). See generally S. REP. No. 249, supra note 61, at 45-59; Office of Indus.,
Summary of Statutory Provisions Related to Import Relief, reprinted in Ninth Annual
Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 94 F.R.D.
350, 503-06 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Summary of Statutory Provisions]; Cosgrove, Techni-
cal Analysis of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 1497 (1979).
For information on how to file a countervailing duty petition, see generally Countervail-
ing Duties, [Reference File] U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY (BNA) 40:0106-0115 (1983); DEKmFFEM,
When, Why, and How to Bring a Countervailing Duty Proceeding: A Complainant's Per-
spective, 6 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REC. 363 (1980-81). For information from the defense
perspective, see generally Hemmendinger & Barringer, The Defense of Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Investigations Under the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 6 N.C.J. INT'L
L. & COM. REC. 427 (1980-81).
71. For the definition of "interested party," see 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9) (1982).
72. 19 U.S.C. § 1671a (1982).
Countervailing duty investigations can be initiated by the Department of
Commerce or by petition. Within 20 days after a petition is filed, Commerce
determines whether the petition alleges the elements necessary for relief (material
injury to a domestic industry by reason of subsidized imports) and includes informa-
tion reasonably available to the petitioner supporting the allegations. If the determi-
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petition alleges the elements necessary for imposition of a duty,7 3
the ITC conducts its "material injury" investigation while Com-
merce investigates whether a "subsidy" has been provided.74 If both
reach affirmative determinations, Commerce must calculate the
amount of the net subsidy and assess an equivalent duty.75
nation is affirmative, Commerce begins an investigation to determine whether
subsidization exists. If the determination is negative, the proceedings end.
Summary of Statutory Provisions, supra note 70, at 505. See also S. REP. No. 249, supra note
61, at 45-47 (providing similar support).
A countervailing duty investigation shall be commenced whenever the adminis-
tering authority determines, from information available to it, that a formal investi-
gation is warranted into the question of whether the elements necessary for the
imposition of a duty under section 1671(a) of this title exist . . . [or) whenever an
interested party . . . files a petition with the administering authority, on behalf of
an industry, which alleges the elements necessary for the imposition of the duty
imposed by section 1671(a) of this title ....
19 U.S.C. § 1671a(a), (b)(1) (1982).
If the investigation is initiated by petition, the petition must be filed on the same day
with Commerce and the ITC. 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(b)(1), (2) (1982).
73. 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(b)(1) (1982).
74. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b, 1671d (1982). Both Commerce and the ITC must conduct their
investigations and issue preliminary and final determinations within time periods specified by
statute. The time periods are:
Within 45 days after a petition is filed or an investigation is initiated by
Commerce, the Commission determines whether there is a reasonable indication
that injury to a domestic industry exists by reason of subsidized imports. If the
determination is negative, the proceedings end.
If the Commission's determination is affirmative, within 85 days after a peti-
tion is filed or an investigation is initiated, Commerce makes a preliminary determi-
nation, based on the best evidence available at the time, of whether there is a
reasonable basis to believe or suspect that a subsidy exists. In extraordinarily compli-
cated cases, this determination is made within 150 days.
If the preliminary determination is affirmative, Commerce (a) requires bonds
or cash deposits to be posted for allegedly subsidized imports in an amount equal to
the estimated net subsidy, and (b) continues its investigation. The Commission
initiates an investigation to determine whether injury exists. If Commerce's prelimi-
nary determination is negative, the investigation simply continues.
Within 75 days after its preliminary determination, Commerce makes a final
determination of whether a subsidy exists. If this determination is negative, the
proceedings end.
If Commerce's final determination is affirmative (following an affirmative
preliminary determination), the Commission makes a final determination of
whether a domestic industry is being materially injured by reason of subsidized
imports before the later of (1) the 120th day after Commerce makes its affirmative
preliminary determination, or (2) the 45th day after Commerce makes its affirma-
tive final determination. In a case where Commerce's preliminary determination is
negative, the Commission's final determination on material injury is made within
75 days after Commerce's affirmative final determination on subsidy.
Summary of Statutory Provisions, supra note 70, at 505.
75. 19 U.S.C. § 1671e (1982). "If the final determination of the Commission is affirma-
tive, a countervailing duty order requiring imposition of countervailing duties is issued within
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A. ITC "Material Injury" Determination
In its preliminary investigation, the ITC determines whether
there are reasonable indications that an industry in the United
States "is materially injured, or ... is threatened with material
injury, or. . .the establishment of an industry in the United States
is materially retarded, by reason of" the allegedly subsidized im-
ports. 76 To determine whether "material injury" has occurred, the
ITC must conduct a three step investigation: (1) apply the statutory
definition of "industry" to determine the scope of the industry at
issue; (2) decide whether there was a material injury or threat of
material injury to the defined industry or whether the establish-
ment of an industry was materially retarded; and (3) determine
whether any such material injury was in fact caused by the subsi-
dized imports. 77
1. What is the Scope of the "Industry?"
To begin an investigation, the ITC delineates the scope of the
industry in the United States that may be adversely affected by the
allegedly subsidized imports.7 8 Section 771(4)(A) of the Act defines
"industry" as "the domestic producers as a whole of a like product,
or those producers whose collective output of the like product con-
stitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of that
product."79
7 days of notification of the Commission's determination." Summary of Statutory Provisions,
supra note 70, at 505.
76. 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(a) (1982).
According to S. REP. No. 249, supra note 70, the "reasonable indication" standard
should be applied in the "same manner as the 'reasonable indication' standard under section
201(c)(2) of the Antidumping Act, 1921 ...The burden of proof ...would be on the
petitioner." Id. at 49.
77. Note, supra note 67, at 1187; The three part procedure for determining material
injury was also described in Rail Passenger Cars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. 36,042, 36,046
(U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n 1982) (preliminary determination) (Stern, Comm'r, dissenting).
78. See Note, supra note 67, at 1198-1200.
79. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(A) (1982). The Act allows the exclusion of domestic producers
from the "industry" when the producers are "related" to exporters or importers of the
subsidized product under investigation or are themselves importers of the subsidized product.
Id. § 1677(4)(B). The Act also permits a determination of material injury based upon
material injury to regional industries in situations where there is no material injury to the
domestic producers as a whole. Id. § 1677(4)(C). In situations in which data on the "like
product" cannot be separated from the broader industry's production or profit information,
the Act directs the ITC to frame the industry in terms of the narrowest possible group or
range of products which include the like product. Id. § 1677(4)(D). See generally S. REP. No.
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"Like product" is the key concept in identifying the domestic
producers that comprise the industry in a given investigation.80
Section 771(10) defines "like product" as "a product which is like,
or in the absence of like, most similar in characteristics and uses
with, the article subject to an investigation under this subtitle. ' ',"
In order to determine whether a domestic industry is materi-
ally injured, therefore, the Act directs the ITC to identify the
imported products and then identify domestic producers of prod-
ucts like the imported goods.8 2 The United States manufacturing
facilities of producers of "like products" constitute the domestic
industry against which the impact of allegedly subsidized imports is
assessed. 8 3
In Railcars, as a threshold matter, the ITC was required to
determine whether the imported products consisted of finished sub-
way cars, subway components or prime contractor services.8 4 Bom-
bardier planned to manufacture the subway car shells itself in
Canada and subcontract the manufacture of the other components
to United States and foreign manufacturers.85 Thus, Bombardier
bid on the MTA contract both as a producer of car shells and as a
prime contractor of finished subway cars.86 At the time of the ITC
preliminary determination, Bombardier had not yet awarded the
subcontracts. 87 Consequently, the ITC could not ascertain which
components other than car shells would be imported. 88 Bombardier
planned to assemble the finished cars at its plant in the United
States from the foreign and domestically produced components. 89
249, supra note 61, at 82-84. For discussion of definition of industry by product lines and
regional industries, see generally Note, supra note 67, at 1198-1200. "What constitutes a
major proportion of total domestic production will vary from case to case depending on the
facts, and no standard minimum proportion is required in each case." S. REP. No. 249, supra
note 61, at 83.
80. Rail Passenger Cars From Canada, 47 Fed, Reg. 36,042, 36,046 (U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n 1982) (preliminary determination) (Stern, Comm'r, dissenting).
81. 19 U.S.C. §1677(10) (1982). See generally S. REP. No. 249, supra note 61, at 90-91.
82. Rail Passenger Cars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. at 36,046 (Stern, Comm'r, dissent-
ing).
83. Id.
84. Certain Rail Passenger Cars and Parts Thereof Imported From Canada, 47 Fed.
Reg. 31,449, 31,449 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n 1982) (notice of change in scope of investiga-
tion).
85. Rail Passenger Cars From Canada, 47 Fed, Reg. 36,042, 36,043 (U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n 1982) (preliminary determination).
86. See id.; ITC Prelim. Rep., supra note 20, at A-7.
87. See ITC Prelim. Rep., supra note 20, at A-7.
88. Rail Passenger Cars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. at 36,043.
89. See id.
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Accordingly, no finished subway cars would be imported under the
MTA contract."° Thus, the ITC preliminarily determined that the
domestically produced "like products" consisted of subway car
shells and other components used in producing subway cars and
that the domestic producers of these articles constituted the relevant
domestic "industry.""1
Budd, if it had won the MTA contract, did not plan to produce
any subway car components itself but rather intended to subcon-
tract the manufacture of all the components.9 2 Budd would have
provided design, engineering, technological, testing and warranty
services. 3 Thus, the ITC concluded that Budd had bid as a prime
contractor and that the loss of the MTA contract initially affected
Budd as a prime contractor, not as a producer. 94 Because the serv-
ices of a prime contractor are not "products," the ITC found that
Budd, in its role as a prime contractor, "may not constitute an
'industry' in the United States.
9 5
Although Budd produces subway car shells in the United
States,96 it planned to subcontract production of the shells to a
manufacturer in Portugal if it had won the MTA contract. 7 Never-
theless, the ITC found that the products of Budd met "the 'like'
product test" and that Budd was therefore part of an "industry"
within the meaning of the Act.98
2. Was an Industry "Materially Injured?"
The second step in the ITC investigation is to determine
whether the allegedly subsidized imports have materially injured or
threaten to materially injure the identified industry.9 Section
771(7)(A) defines "material injury" as "harm which is not inconse-
quential, immaterial or unimportant.' 00 The Act requires the ITC
90. See id.; see also id. at 36,045 (Stern, Comm'r clissenting).
91. Id. at 36,043.
92. ITC Prelim. Rep., supra note 20, at A-5, A-7.
93. Rail Passenger Cars from Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. at 36,048 (Stern, Comm'r, dissent-
ing).
94. Id. at 36,043. See also id. at 36,048 (Stern, Comm'r, dissenting).
95. Id. at 36,043.
96. ITC Prelim. Rep., supra note 20, at A-5.
97. Rail Passenger Cars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. at 36,043 n.14, 36,047-48 (Stern,
Comm'r, dissenting).
98. Id. at 36,043.
99. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a)(2), 1671b(a), 1671d(b) (1982).
100. Id. § 1677(7)(A) (1982). See generally S. REP. No. 249, supra note 61, at 86-89.
There is a split of opinion regarding the degree of injury that must be shown to satisfy the
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in making its determination to consider, among other factors, the
volume of subsidized imports, the effect of subsidized imports on
the prices in the United States of like products, and the impact of
subsidized imports on domestic producers of like products.' 0' Nei-
ther the presence nor absence of any one factor is decisive.10 2
The issue for the ITC in Railcars was whether the alleged
subsidy would materially injure Budd and United States producers
of subway components.103 Bombardier planned to import the sub-
way shells for the MTA contract from Canada. 0 4 If Budd had won
the contract, it would also have imported the car shells. 105 Never-
theless, the ITC found that Budd, as a domestic producer of car
shells, would be materially injured by reason of the allegedly subsi-
dized import of car shells from Canada. 0 6
The ITC found that the availability of subsidized financing
was an important factor in the MTA's decision to award the con-
tract to Bombardier. 0 7 The availability of subsidized financing to
Bombardier and Francorail prompted Budd to seek foreign financ-
ing in order to remain competitive. 108 Portugal and Brazil agreed to
provide financing at favorable terms if Budd would subcontract
production of the car shells and other components to manufacturers
in those countries.' 09 The ITC found that Budd's decision to subcon-
tract components abroad would result in diminished employment
and diminished use of Budd's production facilities in the United
States." 0 The ITC thus determined that the adverse consequences
of Budd's decision to produce components abroad was a cognizable
statutory requirement of material injury. Some say the standard is the same "'more than de
minimis" standard applied in the pre-1979 antidumping laws that required a showing of
injury. Others believe that the Act calls for a greater degree of harm than the previous
standard. Seventh Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, 88 F.R.D. 369, 475 (1979).
101. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B), (C) (1982).
102. Id. § 1677(7)(E)(ii).
103. Certain Rail Passenger Cars and Part Thereof Imported From Canada, 47 Fed.
Reg. 31,449 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n 1982) (notice in change in scope of investigation).
104. See ITC Prelim. Rep., supra note 18, at A-7.
105. Rail Passenger Cars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. 36,042, 36,043 n.14 (U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n 1982) (preliminary determination).
106. Id. at 36,043.
107. See id. at 36,043-44.
108. See id. at 36,044.
109. See ITC Prelim. Rep., supra note 20, at A-10.
110. Rail Passenger Cars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. at 36,044.
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injury under the Act.II' The ITC found a reasonable indication that
Budd and other component producers were materially injured or
threatened with material injury by reason of the allegedly subsi-
dized imports. 112
3. Was an Industry Injured "By Reason Of" Subsidized Imports?
The Act requires imposition of a countervailing duty only if an
industry in the United States is materially injured "by reason of" the
subsidized imports." 3 Thus, the ITC's third step is to determine
whether the subsidized import is an identifiable cause of the in-
jury. 14 The Act retained the standard set forth by the United States
Customs Court in Pasco Terminals, Inc. v. United States that the
unfair foreign competition need not be "the sole cause, the major
cause, or greater than any other single cause of injury."'1 5 The ITC
need not weigh the effects of the subsidized imports against the
effects of other factors that may be injuring the industry."16 How-
ever, it is necessary to examine other possible causes of material
injury to determine whether any injury was in fact caused by the
subsidized imports." 7 If all of the material injury was caused by
factors other than the subsidized imports, the ITC must make a
negative determination. 11
In Railcars, the ITC preliminarily determined that "both
Budd and the manufacturers of components 'like' the articles to be
imported [were] materially injured or [were] threatened with mate-
rial injury by reason of the allegedly subsidized imports.""19
In summary, the ITC reached an affirmative preliminary de-
termination, finding that the "industry" consisted of subway com-
111. Id.
112. Id. at 36,042, 36,044.
113. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671(a)(2), 1671b(a), 1671d(b) (1982). See also S. REP. No. 249,
supra note 61, at 57.
114. Note, Injury Determinations Under United States Antidumping Laws Before and
After the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 33 RUTcGEs L. REV. 1076, 1103 (1981). See S. REP.
No. 249, supra note 61, at 58.
115. 477 F. Supp. 201, 220 (Cust. Ct. 1979), aff'd, 634 F.2d 610 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
116. See S. REP. No. 249, supra note 61, at 57; H. REP. No. 317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 47
(1979).
117. See id. at 58.
118. Rail Passenger Cars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. 36,042, 36,048 (U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n 1982) (preliminary determination) (Stern, Comm'r, dissenting) (citing Certain
Commuter Airplanes From France and Italy, 47 Fed. Reg. 31,632 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n
1982)).
119. Id. at 36,044 (emphasis added).
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nent producers,12 0 that component producers in the industry, in-
cluding Budd, were "materially injured" or threatened with
material injury,' 2' and that the injury occurred "by reason of" the
allegedly subsidized imports. 22
B. Commerce "Subsidy" Determination
If the ITC preliminarily determines that there is a reasonable
indication that an industry in the United States is materially injured
or threatened with material injury, 23 Commerce must determine
whether a subsidy is provided, directly or indirectly, with respect to
the "manufacture, production or exportation of a class or kind of
merchandise imported into the United States."12 4 If Commerce de-
termines that a subsidy has been provided, it must estimate the
amount of the net subsidy 125 and impose an equivalent duty on the
imported merchandise. 2
In Railcars, the issue for Commerce was whether the export
credit financing and federal and provincial regional grants consti-
tuted "subsidies" within the meaning of the countervailing duty
law. 127
1. Was a "Subsidy" Provided?
a. Does Export Credit Financing at Preferential Rates
Constitute a Subsidy?
Section 771(5) defines "subsidy" as having the same meaning as
the term "bounty or grant" under section 1303 of the Tariff Act of
120. See id. at 36,043.
121. Id. at 36,044.
122. See id. The ITC never made a final determination in Railcars because the proceed-
ing was terminated. Rail Passenger Cars and Parts Thereof From Canada, 48 Fed. Reg.
6793, 6794 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n 1983) (termination of investigation).
123. 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(a) (1982).
124. Id. § 1671b(b) (1982). Commerce must make its preliminary determination within
85 days after a petition is filed or Commerce commences an investigation under section
1671a(b). Id. However, Commerce makes its preliminary determination only if ITC has
made an affirmative preliminary determination. Id. Commerce must also make a final
countervailing duty determination before a countervailing duty can be imposed. Id. § 1671d
(1982).
125. Id. § 1671e (1982).
126. Id.
127, Railcars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg..31,415 (U.S. Dep't of Com., Int'l Trade
Admin. 1982) (initiation of countervailing duty investigation). For a description of the
alleged subsidies, see Railcars From Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 6569 (U.S. Dep't of Com., Int'l
Trade Admin. 1982).
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1930.128 Therefore, every trade practice that has been considered a
"bounty or grant" under section 1303 remains a subsidy under the
Act. 29 Export credit financing at a rate below that commercially
available to the recipient has been judicially determined to be a
"bounty or grant" under section 1303 and therefore qualifies as a
subsidy under the Act.' 30
The Act's definition of "subsidy" also includes any export sub-
sidy described in the "Illustrative List of Export Subsidies" in Annex
A to the GATT Agreement. 131 Export credit financing granted by a
government at a rate below that which the government actually has
to pay for the funds constitutes an export subsidy under item (k) of
Annex A. ' 32 Item (k) exempts from consideration as a subsidy export
128. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5) (1982). The term "bounty or grant" has been construed in
three United States Supreme Court decisions. See supra note 60. See also American Express
Co. v. United States, 472 F.2d 1050 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
129. See S. REP. No. 249, supra note 61, at 84. The following general classes of bounties
and grants have been the subject of countervailing duty orders:
(1) direct payments made to producers on their export sales
(2) preferential income tax treatment through special tax rates, preferential depre-
ciation allowances or deductibility of expenses
(3) excessive rebates of indirect taxes
(4) rebates of secondary indirect taxes on goods or services not directly related to
production of the exported goods, such as overhead expenses
(5) preferential interest rates on borrowings connected with exports
(6) price support programs involving sales to exporters at prices below domestic
market prices
(7) subsidization of particular costs such as furnishing of transportation or promo-
tion assistance below cost.
B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARA-
TIVE GUIDE 399 (1978 & Supp. 1983) (footnotes omitted). For a discussion of eight categories
of trade practices which have incurred countervailing duties, see Feller, supra note 60, at 38-
50.
130. See S. REP. No. 249, supra note 61, at 84.
131. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A) (1982). The specific examples of export subsidies in Annex
A are not intended to be exhaustive, but rather illustrate which trade practices are definitely
subsidies. S. REP. No. 249, supra note 61, at 84.
GATT Agreement, supra note 2, at Annex. The Illustrative List of Export Subsidies
annexed to the GATT Agreement sets out various trade practices which are considered export
subsidies. See id.
132. GATT Agreement, supra note 2, at Annex. Item (k) provides as follows:
(k) The grant by governments (or special institutions controlled by and/or acting
under the authority of governments) of export credits at rates below those which
they actually have to pay for the funds so employed (or would have to pay if they
borrowed on international capital markets in order to obtain funds of the same
maturity and denominated in the same currency as the export credit), or the
payment by them of all or part of the costs incurred by exporters or financial
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credit financing which conforms to the interest rate provisions of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's
Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits
(OECD Arrangement) .133
In Railcars, the EDC agreed to finance 85% of the MTA-
Bombardier contract price up to U.S.$750 million at an interest
rate of 9.7% per annum. 3 4 In exchange, the MTA agreed to pro-
vide the EDC with MTA bonds. 3 5 The MTA also agreed to pay the
EDC a loan commitment fee and other administrative costs.1
3 6
Commerce determined that the EDC export credit financing consti-
tuted a subsidy within the meaning of the countervailing duty
law 3 7 because the EDC rate was below the commercial benchmark
for a comparable financing arrangement.3 8 The interest rates and
institutions in obtaining credits, in so far as they are used to secure a material
advantage in the field of export credit terms.
Provided, however, that if a signatory is a party to an international undertak-
ing on official export credits to which at least twelve original signatories to this
Agreement are parties as of 1 January 1979 (or a successor undertaking which has
been adopted by those original signatories), or if in practice a signatory applies the
interest rate provisions of the relevant undertaking, an export credit practice which
is in conformity with those provisions shall not be considered an export subsidy
prohibited by this Agreement.
Id. (footnote omitted).
133. See id. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's Arrange-
ment on Guidelines for Officially Supported Export Credits (OECD Arrangement) minimum
interest rate provisions in effect in 1982 were as follows:
Classification of Number of years in Maximum
Country Repayment Terms
2-5 Over 5-8.5 Over 8.5
I Relatively Rich 11.0% 11.25% N/A
II Intermediate 10.5% 11.0 % N/A
III Relatively poor 10.0% 10.0 % 10.0%
OECD Arrangement, supra note 19, at 2. The OECD Arrangement is applicable among its
Participants, in the form of guidelines, to officially supported export credits with a repay-
ment term of two years or more. Id. at 1. The Participants are the ten countries of the
European Economic Community, Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Japan, New
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. Id.
134. Railcars From Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 6569, 6571 (U.S. Dep't of Com., Int'l Trade
Admin. 1983) (final determination).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 6570, 6572.
138. Id.
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repayment terms offered by the EDC were also below the mini-
mum interest rate provisions permitted by the OECD Arrange-
ment.
139
b. Do Federal and Provincial Regional Grants
Constitute Subsidies?
In Michelin Tire Corp. v. United States, the United States
Court of International Trade affirmed a determination that gov-
ernmental regional development programs can constitute counter-
vailable bounties. 140
In Railcars, Commerce found that Bombardier's Mass Transit
Division had received grants from the Canadian Department of
Regional Economic Expansion (DREE)'4 1 which provides grants to
industries to encourage growth in various Canadian regions. 42 In
addition, Bombardier's Mass Transit Division had received provin-
cial grants from the Quebec Industrial Development Corporation
to purchase equipment used to produce the railcars for the MTA
contract.143 Commerce determined that a portion of the DREE
grants and the provincial grants from the Quebec Industrial Devel-
opment Corporation constituted subsidies within the meaning of
the countervailing duty law. 44
2. Calculation of the Subsidy
Section 706(2)(1) requires Commerce to assess a countervailing
duty "equal to the amount of the net subsidy" if both Commerce
and the ITC issue final affirmative determinations. 4 5 Section
771(6) specifies what Commerce may subtract from the gross sub-
sidy to calculate the "net subsidy.' 146
The Statements of Administrative Action provide that "[t]he
value of a subsidy in the form of [a] low interest rate loan would be
139. See ITC Prelim. Rep., supra note 20, at A-46. For a listing of the OECD Arrange-
ment minimum interest rate provisions, see supra note 133.
140. 2 Ct. Int'l Trade 143, 169 (1981).
141. Railcars From Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 6569, 6573 (U.S. Dep't of Com., Int'l Trade
Admin. 1983) (final determination).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. But see notes 157-58 and accompanying text (DREE grant should not have
been countervailed).
145. 19 U.S.C. § 1671e(a)(1) (1982).
146. Id. § 1677(6) (1982).
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the difference between the interest rate of the loan and the interest
rate which the particular enterprise receiving it would otherwise be
reasonably expected to pay.''147
The proper method for calculating a bounty or grant in the
form of a low interest rate loan was discussed by the United States
Court of International Trade in Michelin Tire Corp. v. United
States. 48 The court found that the proper way to calculate the
bounty or grant was to look at the "benefit experienced by the
recipient" rather than the sacrifice made by the party supplying a
financial resource. 49 The court also found that the proper date
from which to measure the benefit to the recipient was when the
recipient "became certain to receive the rate under scrutiny, not
when he actually receive[d] the amount.' 150
In Railcars, Commerce calculated the subsidy conferred by
EDC by comparing EDC's interest rate with the commercial mar-
ket rates Bombardier would have paid on June 10, 1982, to offer
the MTA comparable financing. 5 1 Commerce's calculation de-
pended on two key determinations: that June 10, 1982, was the
relevant date from which to calculate the benefits, 52 and that the
interest rate which Bombardier, rather than the MTA, would have
paid was the relevant benchmark rate. 53 Commerce found that the
export credit financing included five different elements of economic
benefit to Bombardier, 5 4 and determined that the net subsidy con-
ferred upon Bombardier by the EDC financing equalled
U.S.$90.882 million, or U.S.$110,160 per subway car. 55
Commerce determined that the net subsidy conferred upon
Bombardier bv the federal and Drovincial regional grants eaualled
147. STATEMENTS, supra note 7, at 433. The Statements summarize the changes in
United States trade law made by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 and describe the manner
in which the law is to be administered. Id. at 389.
148. 2 Ct. Int'l Trade 143, 150-55 (1981).
149. Id. at 151.
150. Id. at 153.
151. Railears From Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 6569, 6572 (U.S. Dep't of Com., Int'l Trade
Admin. 1983) (final determination).
152. Id.
153. See id.
154. Id. at 6571-73. The five elements of possible value bestowed by the EDC financing
and of economic benefit to Bombardier were as follows: intrinsic value of the MTA's
opportunity to finance at 9.7%, option value in the MTA's right to use or not use the EDC
financing, commitment fee, interest charges Bombardier would have incurred to obtain
comparable financing, and exchange rate exposure. Id.
155. Id. at 6572.
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U.S.$405 per railcar. 15 6 However, several months later, while con-
sidering an unrelated investigation which involved the same Cana-
dian provincial grant program, Commerce found that the provin-
cial grant provided in Railcars should not have been
countervailed.157 Commerce corrected its calculation of the subsidy
in Railcars by deducting the U.S.$173 per subway car attributed to
the provincial grant. 58 Commerce then calculated that the total net
subsidy in Railcars should have been U.S.$110,392 per subway car,
instead of U.S. $110,565.159
IV. ANALYSIS OF HOW THE COUNTERVAILING DUTY
LAW WAS APPLIED IN RAILCARS
A. Was the Scope of the "Industry" too Broadly Defined
in Railcars?
In Railcars, the ITC preliminarily determined that the im-
ported merchandise consisted of shells and other components of
subway cars. 16 0 A subway car consists of seven major component
systems that comprise a significant portion of the total cost of
manufacture,' 6 ' plus thousands of other components, none of which
alone accounts for more than one percent of the total cost.162 Since
the component parts are not "like" one another, 163 come from
separate sources,6 4 and are manufactured by different domestic
producers,165 the producers of each major component part consti-
156. Id. at 6573.
157. Certain Softwood Products From Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159, 24,173 (U.S.
Dep't of Com., Int'l Trade Admin. 1983) (final negative countervailing duty determination).
158. Id. at 24,173-74.
159. Id.; Railcars From Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. at 6569.
160. Rail Passenger Cars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. 36,042, 36,043 (U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n 1982) (preliminary determination).
161. See ITC Prelim. Rep., supra note 20, at A-3. The seven major subway car
subassemblies are the following: (1) the shell, which generally includes a floor, sides, top,
ends, an underframe, and some wiring; the components of the truck, which include (2) the
wheels and axles and (3) the truck frame and suspension (castings and bolsters); (4) the
coupler assembly, including both mechanical and electrical coupler and draft gear; (5)
brakes; (6) the propulsion system, including traction motors, gearing for motors, controls,
and auxiliary electricals; and (7) the air conditioning system. These components are always
manufactured in accordance with the specifications of the transit system purchaser. See Rail
Passenger Cars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. at 36,047 (Stern, Comm'r, dissenting).
162. See Rail Passenger Cars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. at 36,047 (Stern, Comm'r,
dissenting).
163. See ITC Prelim. Rep., supra note 20, at A-3.
164. See id. at A-7.
165. See id. at A-18 to A-20.
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tute a separate "industry.' 16 6 In Railcars, the ITC's definition of the
"industry" as all producers of subway components167 was too broad
because the import of one component does not injure the domestic
producers of a different component.168
Once the ITC had identified the imported products as subway
car shells and components, it should have gone a step further and
analyzed specifically which of the components would be imported
and which would be domestically produced. This was crucial to the
ITC's injury determination because under the Act, components
manufactured in the United States cannot cause injury to other
United States component producers. 6 9
Of the seven major components which comprise a subway car,
Bombardier planned to import only the shell from Canada. 170 All of
the other major components will be manufactured in the United
States.'17 The components to be produced in the United States are
obviously not imported and, therefore, no domestic producers of
those components could be injured "by reason of" subsidized im-
ports as is required for imposition of a duty under the Act. 172 The
ITC should have issued a negative determination with regard to the
domestic producers of the six major components to be produced in
the United States under the Bombardier contract.
At the time of the ITC determination, Bombardier had not yet
awarded subcontracts for the thousands of other components to be
used in the subway cars. 173 Therefore, it was impossible to know
which components would be imported and which would be domes-
166. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(A), (D) (1982).
The inclusion of producers of unlike products in the same industry is contrary to the
statutory definitions of "like product," 19 U.S.C. § 1677(10) (1982), and "industry," id. §
1677(4)(A) (1982). See also Certain Spirits From Ireland, 46 Fed. Reg. 38,780 (U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n 1981) (negative material injury determination in which the ITC narrowly
defined the relevant domestic industries); S. REP. No. 249, supra note 61, at 90.
167. Rail Passenger Cars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. at 36,043. See also supra notes 84-
98 and accompanying text (how the ITC defined the industry in Railcars).
168. For example, the import of shells does not harm a United States producer of
brakes, but the ITC's definition of industry in Railcars includes both. Id.
169. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4), (10) (1982).
170. See ITC Prelim. Rep., supra note 20, at A-7.
171. Id.
172. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (1982) authorizes imposition of a countervailing duty only for
unfairly subsidized merchandise "imported into the United States." Id.
173. ITC Prelim. Rep., supra note 20, at A-7.
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tically produced.174 The ITC assumed 75 that many of these compo-
nents would be produced in Canada because the EDC financing
was conditional on a minimum Canadian content of 60% of the
value of the contract. 176 However, the ITC staff report acknowl-
edged that the extent to which Bombardier would meet that condi-
tion was unknown. 77 The ITC has held that when an industry
cannot be presently defined, or injury or threat of injury be estab-
lished, an affirmative determination is premature. 7 8 Similarly in
Railcars, the affirmative determination was premature for domestic
producers of components whose sources were not known at the time
of the ITC determination.
If the ITC had correctly determined that the domestic pro-
ducers of all major components other than shells and that the
domestic producers of the thousands of minor components did not
constitute "industries" for purposes of this determination, it would
have narrowly defined the industry as the domestic producers of
shells. Budd is the only United States shell producer, 79 but it would
not have used its United States shell manufacturing facilities if it
had won the MTA contract. 80
Thus, not only was the ITC's determination premature, but it
is questionable whether under the MTA contract Budd, as a domes-
tic producer of shells, would have suffered any injury because the
Budd shells, like the Bombardier shells, would have been produced
by a foreign manufacturer and imported into the United States.
B. Can a Prime Contractor Constitute an Industry
Under the Act?
A prime contractor is wholly responsible for implementing the
provisions of a contract and assumes the risks.' Prime contracting
174. Rail Passenger Cars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. 36,042, 36,043 (U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n 1982) (preliminary determination). "Most of the items to be imported, with the
exception of the subway car shells, cannot currently be identified." Id. Bombardier did not
plan to enter final negotiations with its prospective subcontractors until it had received a
formal notice to proceed from the MTA. See ITC Prelim, Rep., supra note 20, at A-7.
175. See Rail Passenger Cars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. at 36,043.
176. ITC Prelim. Rep., supra note 20, at A-7.
177. ITC Final Rep., supra note 18, at A-34.
178. Certain Commuter Airplanes From France and Italy, 47 Fed. Reg. 31,632 (U.S.
Int'l Trade Comm'n 1982) (preliminary determination).
179. ITC Final Rep., supra note 18, at A-14; ITC Prelim. Rep., supra note 20, at A-36.
180. Rail Passenger Cars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. 36,042, 36,043 n. 14, 36,047 (U.S.
Int'l Trade Comm'n 1982) (preliminary determination) (Stern, Comm'r, dissenting).
181. ITC Final Rep., supra note 18, at A-10.
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firms often make substantial investments in engineering and design
services and in drafting proposals for a contract bid. 182 Prime con-
tractors of subway cars subcontract the manufacture of most, if not
all, of the major components and often enlist other firms to assem-
ble them. 183
The Act requires subsidized merchandise to be imported into
the United States before a countervailing duty can be imposed.
18 4
Prime contractor services are not considered merchandise. 185 Thus,
if only prime contractor services, but no merchandise, were im-
ported, the Act would not apply.
For the purpose of its preliminary determination, the ITC did
not consider prime contractors of subway cars an "industry."'186 The
ITC recognized that, in general, a prime contractor may not meet
the statutory definition of "industry" under the Act.18 7 The ITC left
open final resolution of the question of whether and under what
circumstances a prime contractor would be considered an "indus-
try."188
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(1) (1982).
185. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
186. Rail Passenger Cars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. 36,042, 36,043 (U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n 1982) (preliminary determination).
187. Id.
188. The views of ITC Chairman Alfred Eckes and ITC Commissioners Michael
Calhoun, Eugene Frank and Veronica Haggart are as follows: "[T]here is a legal question as
to whether Budd, as a prime contractor, can claim to be materially injured by reason of the
imports under investigation inasmuch as Budd is not literally a producer of a product 'like'
those products being imported." Id.
Commissioner Veronica Haggart notes that "the current U.S. countervailing duty law,
as it traditionally has been interpreted and applied, does not appear to permit the granting of
relief to a prime contractor under the facts of this case." Id. at 36,043 n.20.
Commissioner Michael Calhoun questioned
whether the imports referred to under section 703 as 'merchandise' include service
functions .... [A]lthough it seems rather clear that for the statute to be applicable
there must be imports of merchandise and not services, can the domestic industry be
those who produce a like product by performing more of a service than actual
manufacturing? ... Under what circumstances, if any, can prime contracting be
considered a domestic industry, as defined in the Act?
Id. at 36,045 (Calhoun, Comm'r, additional views).
Commissioner Paula Stern opined that prime contractor services "are not protected" by
the definition of "industry" in the Act. "The countervailing duty laws cover such services only
to the extent that they are inseparably connected to the importation of a product like the
imported article subject to investigation." Id. at 36,048 (Stern, Comm'r, dissenting).
COUNTERVAILING DUTIES
C. Material Injury and Budd's Standing to Sue
The ITC must consider the impact of subsidized imports on the
volume of imports in assessing material injury. 189 If Budd had won
the contract, it would have imported the shells from a manufac-
turer in Portugal.1 90 Since Budd's shell manufacturing facilities in
the United States would not have been used, the volume of im-
ported shells would have been exactly the same whether the con-
tract had been awarded to Bombardier or Budd.' 9' Only the Portu-
gese manufacturer, not Budd, was injured by the importation of
shells from Canada for the MTA contract. 1912 Therefore, Budd did
not have standing to complain that it was injured or threatened
with material injury by the importation of shells from Canada. 93
In Railcars, the ITC determined that as a domestic producer of
shells, Budd was materially injured by the allegedly subsidized
imported shells.'94 This conflicts with the ITC's earlier determina-
tion in Snow-Grooming Vehicles, Parts Thereof and Accessories
Therefor From the Federal Republic of Germany. 9 5 In that case,
the ITC found that the increased imports from the country under
investigation merely displaced imports from another country."
189. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B), (C) (1982). See also S. REP. No. 249, supra note 61, at 86-
87.
190. See Rail Passenger Cars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. 36,042, 36,044 (U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n 1982) (preliminary determination). See also, ITC Prelim. Rep., supra note
20, at A-5.
191. Budd planned to subcontract the shells from Portugal and import them. Rail
Passenger Cars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. at 36,044. Bombardier planned to manufacture
the shells in Canada and import them. ITC Prelim. Rep., supra note 20, at A-7. Therefore,
the volume of imports would have been 825 shells whether Budd or Bombardier had received
the contract.
192. Since Budd did not plan to act as a "domestic producer" of shells, it did not meet
the statutory definition of "industry." Id. § 1677(4) (A) (1982). Imposition of a countervailing
duty requires "material injury" to an "industry." Id. § 1671(a)(2) (1982). Since Budd is not an
"industry," it cannot be injured within the meaning of the Act.
193. When a countervailing duty investigation is initiated by petition, the petition must
be filed "on behalf of an industry." Id. § 1671a(b) (1982). Since Budd is not an "industry," no
countervailing duty petition may be filed on its behalf. See id.
194. Rail Passenger Cars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. at 36,042, 36,044 (U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n 1982) (preliminary determination).
195. 46 Fed. Reg. 1049 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n 1981) (preliminary determination).
196. Id. at 1052 (Stern, Comm'r, views). In Snow-Grooming Vehicles, an antidumping
investigation of imported snow-grooming vehicles from West Germany, the ITC found that
Kassbohrer of West Germany and Bombardier Limited of Canada (coincidentally, the same
company at issue in Railcars) were the only foreign producers known to have exported snow-
grooming vehicles to the United States. Id. at 1052 n.24. Kassbohrer's increased market share
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Consequently, the ITC found no reasonable indication of material
injury or threat of material injury. 97 Similarly, in Railcars, the
shells to be imported from Canada will merely displace shells which
would have been imported from Portugal. Consequently, a nega-
tive determination should have been made.
D. Causation
In addition to defining the industry and determining whether
there is material injury, the ITC is required to find that the injury
occurred "by reason of" the subsidized imports.198 The Statements
of Administrative Action'9 9 that implement the Act require that "[a]
written statement of the reasons for the [ITC's] decisions on all
material issues of law or fact presented shall be available to the
parties and the public. 20 0 The importance of a statement of reasons
given in support of an administrative determination has been
clearly recognized by the United States Supreme Court.20 Depart-
ing from its usual practice, the ITC in Railcars failed to separately
state the basis for its finding of causation, which is a material issue
in a countervailing duty proceeding. The ITC merely stated in
conclusory fashion that material injury was caused "by reason of"
subsidized imports. 20 2 A written statement of its reasons was partic-
ularly important in this case because the causation analysis was
unusually complicated. The ITC was faced with the question of
in the United States had apparently resulted from a sharp decline in Bombardier's exports to
the United States. Id. at 1052 & n.24.
197. Id. at 1049, 1051.
198. 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (1982).
199. STATEMENTS, supra note 7. Approval of the Statements, which implement the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 2(a), 93 Stat. 144, 147, is codifed at 19
U.S.C. § 2503(a) (1982).
200. STATEMENTS, supra note 7, at 398.
201. Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194 (1947). The Court held:
If the administrative action is to be tested by the basis upon which it purports to
rest, that basis must be set forth with such clarity as to be understandable. It will
not do for a court to be compelled to guess at the theory underlying the agency's
action; nor can a court be expected to chisel that which must be precise from what
the agency has left vague and indecisive. In other words, "We must know what a
decision means before the duty becomes ours to say whether it is right or wrong."
Id. at 196-97 (quoting United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., 294 U.S. 499, 511
(1935)).
202. Bail Passenger Cars From Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. 36,042, 36,044 (U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n 1982) (preliminary determination).
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whether injury to Budd as a component producer is cognizable
under the Act when the foreign subsidy is provided not to a compet-
ing foreign producer but to a foreign prime contractor. 20 3 The ITC
found that the result of Budd's decision to import shells from Portu-
gal would have been decreased employment in and decreased utili-
zation of its United States manufacturing facilities. 20 4 The ITC
majority reasoned that Budd's decision to subcontract from Portu-
gal was a result of EDC financing. 2 5 The ITC concluded that the
adverse consequences to the United States component industry of
Budd's decision to import rather than domestically produce compo-
nents in order to be competitive is cognizable under section
771(7)(B) .206
Two ITC commissioners expressed reservations about the
ITC's finding of causation. 20 7 Commissioner Michael Calhoun, who
voted with the majority, questioned whether the case revealed a
reasonable indication of nexus between the subsidized imports and
the domestic producers. 20 8 Dissenting Commissioner Paula Stern
concluded that Budd would have subcontracted the shells from
Portugal even if it had obtained matching financing because it was
more profitable than manufacturing the shells in the United
States. 20 9 Both Commissioners Calhoun 21 0 and Stern 211 expressed the
belief that Railcars might conflict with the ITC's earlier determina-
tion in Certain Commuter Airplanes from France and Italy.2 12 In
that case, the ITC concluded that the domestic industry's failure to
take sufficient steps to compete, rather than subsidized imports,
had caused the material injury.21 3 Consequently, the ITC issued a
203. Id. at 36,043.
204. Id. at 36,044.
205. See id.
206. Id.; 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(B) (1982).
207. Id. at 36,045 (Calhoun, Comm'r, additional views); 36,048 (Stern, Comm'r,
dissenting).
208. Id. at 36,045 (Calhoun, Comm'r. additional views).
209. Id. at 36,048 (Stern, Comm'r, dissenting).
210. Id. at 36,045 (Calhoun, Comm'r, additional views).
211. Id. at 36,048 (Stern, Comm'r, dissenting).
212. Certain Commuter Airplanes From France and Italy, 47 Fed. Reg. 31,632 (U.S.
Int'l Trade Comm'n 1982) (preliminary determination).
213. The ITC issued a negative determination after finding that the limited nature of
the United States industry's marketing efforts restricted its market and prevented it from
competing for sales, rather than the imports. Id. at 31,634. Consequently, the ITC found
that "the record does not provide a reasonable indication of a causal link between the
allegedly subsidized sales of [the imported planes] in the United States and any difficulties
[the domestic industry] may be experiencing in becoming established as a producer of a
competitive aircraft." Id.
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negative determination and refused to impose a countervailing
duty. 214
In Railcars, the MTA averred that Budd was aware that the
availability of financing was one of the factors which state law
required the MTA to consider in awarding the contract.2 15 Budd
was also aware that it might qualify for Eximbank financing.2 1 6
However, Budd failed to apply for matching Eximbank financing
until after the MTA had announced its award of the contract to
Bombardier. 217 Since it was not addressed by the ITC, the question
remains whether Budd's failure to take sufficient steps to compete
by applying for Eximbank financing earlier in the negotiations
caused any material injury.
CONCLUSION
The ITC misapplied the countervailing duty law in Railcars
and reached a decision which contravenes the intent of the Act. The
Railcars determinations failed to protect United States industry or
workers. The question remains whether Railcars will be followed as
precedent or whether it will stand as an isolated aberration. Since
the case was terminated, there will be no opportunity for judicial
review to correct the ITC's ruling.
At its first opportunity, the ITC must make it clear that nei-
ther United States producers of domestically produced merchandise
nor prime contractors will be defined as an "industry" under the
Act. The ITC must clarify that injury to domestic producers who
manufacture abroad, as Budd planned to do, is not cognizable
under the Act. Furthermore, the ITC must decide that subsidized
imports which merely displace other imports do not materially
injure any domestic industry. The ITC must state reasons for its
decisions before it issues affirmative determinations.
Rhonda G. Kirschner
214. Id. at 31,632.
215. Brief for Defendant at 4, Budd Co. v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., No. 82 Civ.
3744 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1982) (order for dismissal). As early as October 1981, the MTA
informed Budd that in order to be competitive in the negotiations for this contract, they
would have to offer vendor-related financing. Id. Budd was informed repeatedly that it was
in a difficult competitive position due to its lack of competitive financing terms. Id.
216. Id. at 4-5. Richard. Ravitch, former MTA Chairman, and Steven Polan, Special
Counsel to the MTA, repeatedly pointed out that financing might be available through the
Eximbank. Id.
217. Id. at 5.
